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Over the years, the stable-model semantics has gained a position of the correct (two-
valued) interpretation of default negation in programs. However, for programs with
aggregates (constraints), the stable-model semantics, in its broadly accepted generalization
stemming from the work by Pearce, Ferraris and Lifschitz, has a competitor: the semantics
proposed by Faber, Leone and Pfeifer, which seems to be essentially different. Our
goal is to explain the relationship between the two semantics. Pearce, Ferraris and
Lifschitz’s extension of the stable-model semantics is best viewed in the setting of
arbitrary propositional theories. We propose here an extension of the Faber–Leone–Pfeifer
semantics, or FLP semantics, for short, to the full propositional language, which reveals
both common threads and differences between the FLP and stable-model semantics. We
use our characterizations of FLP-stable models to derive corresponding results on strong
equivalence and on normal forms of theories under the FLP semantics. We apply a similar
approach to deﬁne supported models for arbitrary propositional theories, and to study
their properties.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The stable-model semantics introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz [23] is the foundation of answer-set programming [37,
41,22], a paradigm for modeling and solving search problems. Answer-set programming is broadly accepted as an effective
knowledge representation tool for modeling intelligent agents and reasoning in complex domains [12,13,3]. In the last
decade, it has been successfully applied in several areas of artiﬁcial intelligence such as product conﬁguration [47], planning
[50,48], reasoning about action [25], and diagnosis [43,2], with some of these applications concerning large-scale systems
like the space shuttle ﬂight controller [43]. Answer-set programming has also been applied beyond artiﬁcial intelligence for
problems arising in bio-informatics [4,46], linguistics [7] and automated music generation [5].
The success of answer-set programming as a knowledge representation formalism and its applications in artiﬁcial intelli-
gence and beyond make it essential that theoretical underpinnings of its semantics be established. Consequently, right from
its inception, the stable-model semantics, has received much attention. The present paper contributes to this general line of
research by extending the theoretical framework for the stable-model semantics based of the results and ideas proposed and
developed by Pearce [44] and Ferraris [19] to two other closely related semantics that also play a major role in answer-set
programming, the Faber–Leone–Pfeifer stable-model semantics [16] and the supported-model semantics [9,1,38].
A far-reaching contribution by Pearce [44] explained the stable-model semantics in terms of models of theories in the
logic of here-and-there (HT, for short), introduced by Heyting [26]. It had two important consequences. First, it resulted in a
generalization of the stable-model semantics, originally limited to a restricted syntax of program rules, to arbitrary theories
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the notion of strong equivalence of programs, fundamental to modular program development [32]. Strong equivalence has
been extensively studied in the past decade. That research resulted in extensions and reﬁnements of the original concept,
in characterizations, and in complexity results [32,35,51,14,52,49].
The original deﬁnition of stable models [23] was based on the reduct of a program with respect to a set of atoms.
The characterization in terms of the logic HT makes no reference to reducts but employs a form of model minimization.
Ferraris [19] extended the notion of reduct to propositional theories, and developed the reduct-based deﬁnition of stable
models equivalent to that provided by the logic HT (an exposition of the idea can also be found in the paper by Ferraris
and Lifschitz [21]).
The papers by Pearce and Ferraris resulted in an elegant comprehensive treatment of the stable-model semantics. They
also raise the question whether there are other generalizations of the stable-model semantics to the case of arbitrary
logic theories. An indication that it might be so comes from the work by Faber et al. [16] on programs with aggregates.
Aggregates, in the form of weight atoms, were introduced to answer-set programming by Niemelä and Simons [42], who
extended the stable-model semantics to that class of programs. Ferraris [19] cast that generalization in terms of stable
models of propositional theories. Stable models of programs with aggregates are no longer guaranteed to be minimal models.
From the perspective of the Ferraris’ result, it is not surprising. Stable models of propositional theories in general do not
have the minimal-model property.
However, as minimization is an important knowledge-representation principle, Faber et al. [16] sought an alternative
semantics for programs with constraints, one that would have the minimal-model property. Naturally, they also wanted it
to coincide with the original semantics on the class of programs without aggregates. They came up with a solution that
satisﬁed both requirements by modifying the concept of the reduct! In the setting with aggregates, the Faber–Leone–Pfeifer
stable-model semantics, or FLP semantics, is different than the extension of the original stable-model semantics based on
the logic HT (throughout the paper, whenever we speak about the stable-model semantics, we have the original semantics
in mind). Thus, the question of alternative generalizations is relevant. The FLP semantics is steadily gaining on importance.
It is now not only used as the basis for interpreting aggregates in the dlv system [17], but also in approaches aiming to
integrate answer-set programming with other declarative programing paradigms [11].
A related question concerns a possibility of generalizing other semantics relevant to answer-set programming to the
full propositional logic language. The one we consider here is the supported-model semantics. Its importance stems from
two properties. First, the supported-model semantics is the key component of a characterization of stable models in terms
of loop formulas [36], which gave rise to fast algorithms for computing stable models of programs [36,31,30]. Second,
for a class of modal theories of some restricted syntax, it is a precise counterpart to the semantics of expansions of the
autoepistemic logic [40,38], an important nonmonotonic logic for modeling belief sets of an agent with perfect introspection
capabilities.
Given the applications of the Faber–Leone–Pfeifer stable-model semantics as an alternative to the standard Gelfond–
Lifschitz one, and the role of the supported-model semantics in answer-set programming and nonmonotonic logics, our
objective here is to investigate these semantics and show that they also can be studied by the means stemming from those
developed by Pearce and Ferraris for the stable-model semantics. Speciﬁcally, we have the following goals:
(1) To extend the semantics of Faber et al. [16] to the language of propositional logic. We do so in two equivalent ways: by
means of a generalization of the reduct introduced by Faber et al., as well as in terms of a certain satisﬁability relation
similar to the one that deﬁnes the logic HT. We show that the FLP semantics generalizes several properties of the stable-
model semantics of logic programs and so, it can be regarded as its legitimate extension, alongside with the extension
based on the logic HT. We derive several additional properties of the FLP semantics, including a characterization of
strong equivalence under that semantics, and a normal-form result.
(2) To relate the FLP and stable-model semantics of propositional theories. We show that each can be expressed in each
other in the sense that there are modular translations that do not use any auxiliary atoms and such that FLP-stable
models of a theory are stable models of its image under the translation (and vice versa).
(3) To apply a similar two-pronged approach, exploiting both some notion of reduct and some satisﬁability relation, to the
supported model semantics. We show that also supported models can be deﬁned for arbitrary propositional theories. We
generalize to propositional language some well-known properties of supported models, as well as the results connecting
stable and supported models of programs.
While most implemented answer-set programming systems [10] used in applications support only theories consisting
of rules (we formally deﬁne rules in the next section), a generalization of answer-set programming to the full language of
propositional logic is important. From the theoretical standpoint, it eliminates possible artifacts of syntactic restrictions and
allows us to identify key principles behind the semantics of answer-set programming. In particular, considering answer set
programming in the full language pinpoints the basic role of implication as a nonclassical connective, with the nonclassical
behavior of the negation being a consequence of the fact that the negation can be expressed by means of the implication
with the false consequent. The key role of implication is emphasized by the recursive deﬁnitions of the reducts — it is
the only case that is treated in a nonstandard way. Moreover, it leads to the semantics of HT-interpretations, which paves
the way to generalizations of answer-set programming and its semantics to the case of ﬁrst-order logic theories [28,45].
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set programming more ﬂexible as a modeling formalism, and provides a basis for further extensions of the language, for
instance, with aggregates [20].
Our paper demonstrates that the ideas originated by Pearce and Ferraris extend to two other semantics of logic programs:
the FLP semantics and the supported-model semantics. The results concerning the FLP semantics have several potential
implications and applications. They provide a certain normal-form result (cf. Section 4), which points to a possible extension
of the syntax of disjunctive logic program rules currently supported by disjunctive logic programming systems such as dlv.
The results on strong equivalence (cf. Section 3.5) lay the necessary foundation for the development of techniques and
methods for modular program design under the FLP semantics. Finally, the extension of the FLP semantics to arbitrary
rules demonstrates the feasibility of extending the present implementation of the dlv system to a richer input language
not restricted to rules. Our results on the supported-model semantics are also of interest. As we observed above, logic
programming with the supported-model semantics captures in a direct way a fragment of autoepistemic logic [38]. By
extending the supported-model semantics to the entire language of propositional logic, we provide a way to expand the
scope of this direct connection.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we recall two deﬁnitions of stable models of propositional theories.
The ﬁrst one is in terms of a reduct introduced by Ferraris [19]. It extends the original approach of Gelfond and Lifschitz. The
second deﬁnition is in terms of HT-interpretations and is due to Pearce [44]. In Section 3, we discuss the approach by Faber
et al. [16], extend it to arbitrary propositional theories, and study the properties of the resulting concepts. In particular,
we characterize the general FLP-stable-model semantics in terms of the appropriately modiﬁed concept of the reduct, and
in terms of a certain entailment relation based on HT-interpretations. We also discuss the question of the minimality of
FLP-stable models, the complexity of reasoning with FLP-stable models, and the concept of strong equivalence with respect
to FLP-stable models. Finally, we present a normal form theorem for that semantics. In Section 5, we show that techniques
used in our paper can be applied to the supported-model semantics. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne supported models for arbitrary
propositional theories by modifying the notion of a reduct, and by introducing yet another entailment relation based on
HT-interpretations. We derive several results for the generalized supported-model semantics and, in particular, we study
the concept of strong equivalence for supported-model semantics, and the relationship of that semantics to those based on
stable models and FLP-stable models.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we introduce basic terminology and describe the general deﬁnitions of the stable-model semantics in
terms of the here-and-there models [44], and in terms of the Ferraris reduct, or F-reduct, for short [19], that generalizes the
original Gelfond–Lifschitz reduct.
We consider the language of propositional logic determined by an inﬁnite countable set At of atoms, and boolean con-
nectives ⊥, ∧, ∨, and →. A Backus–Naur Form expression ϕ ::= ⊥|A|(ϕ ∧ ϕ)|(ϕ ∨ ϕ)|(ϕ → ϕ), where A ∈ At, provides a
concise deﬁnition of a formula. The parentheses are used only to disambiguate the order of binary operations. Whenever
possible, we omit them. Generalizing the concept of the head of a program rule, we say that an occurrence of an atom is a
head occurrence if it does not occur in the antecedent of any implication. Finally, when writing formulas, we often use the
following shorthands:
 = ⊥ → ⊥ and ¬F = F → ⊥.
A set of formulas is a theory. In the case of all semantics we discuss here, there is no essential difference between ﬁnite
theories and formulas. The former can be represented as the conjunctions of their elements. We often distinguish between
formulas and theories as we want to address the case of inﬁnite theories, too.
In the paper, we consider several special types of formulas and theories. A rule is a formula
A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧ ¬B1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Bn → C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cs ∨ ¬D1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Dt, (1)
where Ai ’s, Bi ’s, Ci ’s and Di ’s are atoms. If we use r to denote the rule (1), we say that the formulas A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧¬B1 ∧
· · · ∧ ¬Bn and C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cs ∨ ¬D1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Dt are the body and the head of r, and denote them by body(r) and head(r),
respectively. If m = n = 0, we represent the rule by its head. If s = t = 0, we write ⊥ for the head of the rule. A program is
a set of rules. We emphasize that the phrases “a head occurrence in a formula”, discussed two paragraphs above, and “an
element of the head of a rule” have a different meaning. In particular, each literal ¬Di is an element of the head of the
rule (1), but the corresponding occurrence of Di in the rule is not a head occurrence.
For consistency with the standard logic programming terminology, when referring to rules (1) with no negated atoms
in the heads, we use the term disjunctive program rule or, simply, disjunctive rule. Further, we call disjunctive rules with at
most one atom in the head normal program rules or, simply normal rules. By the convention above, disjunctive rules have no
negated atoms in the head and so, this terminology agrees with the standard one.
Originally, the stable-model semantics was deﬁned by Gelfond and Lifschitz [23] for normal programs (collections of
normal rules). The deﬁnition was later extended to disjunctive programs, that is, collections of disjunctive rules also by
Gelfond and Lifschitz [24], then to programs as understood here (collections of rules (1)) by Lifschitz and Woo [34], and to
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addressed by Pearce [44] and, later and in a different way, by Ferraris [19]. These last two approaches are equivalent. We
will now discuss them, starting with the latter one.
For a formula F and a set of atoms Y , we deﬁne the Ferraris reduct (F-reduct) of F with respect to Y , written as F Y , by
induction:
R1. ⊥Y = ⊥.
R2. If A is an atom:
AY =
{
A if Y | A,
⊥ otherwise.
R3. For ◦ = ∧ and ∨:
(G ◦ H)Y =
{
GY ◦ HY if Y | G ◦ H,
⊥ otherwise.
R4. For →:
(G → H)Y =
{
GY → HY if Y | G → H,
⊥ otherwise.
We could have folded case (R4) into the case (R3). However, all concepts of reduct we consider later in the paper differ
only in the way the implication is handled and so, we show this case separately.
For a theory F , we deﬁne the F-reduct F Y by setting F Y = {F Y | F ∈ F}. Next, we deﬁne Y ⊆ At to be a stable model of
F if Y is a minimal model of the theory F Y . One can show that stable models are models (hence, the term stable model is
justiﬁed).
We will now illustrate the notions we just introduced. We will use the theories discussed below throughout the paper.
Example 1. Let E1 = {¬¬A → A}. To compute the reduct E∅1 , we note that ∅ | ¬¬A → A (as the formula is a classical
tautology). Thus, E∅1 = (¬¬A)∅ → A∅ . Since ∅ | A, A∅ = ⊥. Moreover, ¬¬A stands for (A → ⊥) → ⊥. Since ∅ | (A →
⊥) → ⊥, (¬¬A)∅ = ((A → ⊥) → ⊥)∅ = ⊥. It follows that E∅1 = ⊥ → ⊥. Clearly, ∅ | E∅1 and, trivially, there is no proper
subset X of ∅ such that X | E∅1 . Thus, ∅ is a stable model of E1.
Similarly, as {A} | ¬¬A → A, E {A}1 = (¬¬A){A} → A{A} . The deﬁnition implies that A{A} = A. Moreover, as {A} | (A →
⊥) → ⊥ (the expanded form of ¬¬A), ((A → ⊥) → ⊥){A} = (A → ⊥){A} → ⊥{A} . Since A | A → ⊥, (A → ⊥){A} = ⊥. Also,
by the deﬁnition, ⊥{A} = ⊥. Thus, E {A}1 = (⊥ → ⊥) → A. Clearly, {A} | E {A}1 . As there is no proper subset X of {A} such that
X | E {A}1 , also {A} is a stable model of E1.
Example 2. Let E2 = {(A ∨ ¬A) → A}. To compute the reduct E∅2 , we note that ∅ | (A ∨ ¬A) → A. Thus, E∅2 = ⊥. It follows,
in particular, that ∅ is not a stable model of E2.
Next, we observe that A | (A ∨ ¬A) → A. Thus, E {A}2 = (A ∨ ¬A){A} → A{A} . Since (¬A){A} = (A → ⊥){A} = ⊥, E {A}2 =
(A ∨ ⊥) → A. Clearly, we have ∅ | E {A}2 . Thus, {A} is not a stable model of E2, either, and so, E2 has no stable models (as
in the case of normal programs, we can restrict the search for stable models to subsets of the set of atoms that occur in the
theory).
This notion of a stable model generalizes all earlier ones. It also coincides with the one proposed by Pearce [44]. The
approach by Pearce is based on the logic HT [26], a logic located strictly between the intuitionistic and the propositional
logics. Stable models are deﬁned in terms of the satisﬁability relation |ht in the logic HT. A pair 〈X, Y 〉, where X, Y ⊆
At, is an HT-interpretation if X ⊆ Y . The relation |ht , between HT-interpretations and formulas, is deﬁned inductively as
follows:
(1) 〈X, Y 〉 |ht ⊥;
(2) 〈X, Y 〉 |ht A if X | A (applies only if A ∈ At);
(3) 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G ∧ H if 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G and 〈X, Y 〉 |ht H ;
(4) 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G ∨ H if 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G or 〈X, Y 〉 |ht H ;
(5) 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G → H if Y | G → H ; and 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G , or 〈X, Y 〉 |ht H .
The relation extends in a standard way to theories. If for a theory F , 〈X, Y 〉 |ht F , then 〈X, Y 〉 is an HT-model of F . Some
important properties of the relation |ht are gathered below (cf. Ferraris and Lifschitz [21]).
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(1) 〈X, Y 〉 |ht F implies Y | F ;
(2) 〈X, Y 〉 |ht ¬F if and only if Y | ¬F ;
(3) 〈Y , Y 〉 |ht F if and only if Y | F .
Pearce [44] deﬁned Y to be a stable model of a theory F if and only if 〈Y , Y 〉 |ht F and for every X ⊆ Y if 〈X, Y 〉 |ht F ,
then X = Y (a form of minimality). Ferraris and Lifschitz [21] proved that the two approaches are equivalent by showing the
following two key results.
Theorem 2. Let F be a theory:
(1) for every Y ⊆ At, Y | F if and only if Y | F Y ;
(2) for every X ⊆ Y ⊆ At, X | F Y if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |ht F .
Example 3. Let us consider the theory E1 = {¬¬A → A} from Example 1 and let Y = ∅. Since Y | (A → ⊥) → ⊥, 〈Y , Y 〉 |ht
(A → ⊥) → ⊥ and Y | ((A → ⊥) → ⊥) → A. Thus, 〈Y , Y 〉 |ht ((A → ⊥) → ⊥) → A or, in other words, 〈Y , Y 〉 |ht E1.
Trivially, there is no proper subset X of Y such that 〈X, Y 〉 |ht E1. Thus, Y = ∅ is a stable model of E1, according to the
deﬁnition by Pearce.
Next, let Z = {A}. Then Z | ((A → ⊥) → ⊥) → A and 〈Z , Z〉 |ht A. Thus, 〈Z , Z〉 |ht ((A → ⊥) → ⊥) → A and, con-
sequently, 〈Z , Z〉 |ht E1. The only proper subset of Z is X = ∅. Clearly, 〈X, Z〉 |ht A (as A /∈ X ). Let us also observe that
Z | (A → ⊥) → ⊥, and 〈X, Z〉 |ht A → ⊥ (as Z | A → ⊥). Thus, 〈X, Z〉 |ht (A → ⊥) → ⊥. It follows that 〈X, Z〉 |ht
((A → ⊥) → ⊥) → A. Thus, 〈X, Z〉 |ht E1, and so Z = {A} is a stable model of E1 according to the deﬁnition by Pearce.
Similarly, one can check that the theory E2 from Example 2 has no stable models according to the deﬁnition by Pearce.
Of course, these outcomes are only to be expected, given our discussion in Examples 1 and 2, and the equivalence of the
deﬁnitions proposed by Ferraris and Pearce.
We conclude by noting that throughout the paper, we are only interested in the satisﬁability of reducts (the one dis-
cussed in this section and two other types we introduce later) with respect to the standard propositional logic semantics.
Thus, whenever we compute the reduct, we can simplify it by using propositional tautologies. Such simpliﬁcations have no
effect on the concept of stability. For instance, we could simplify the reduct E A1 = (⊥ → ⊥) → A to A.
3. FLP semantics
Faber et al. [16] based their work on a notion of reduct that differs from the one proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz.
Using our notation, it can be deﬁned as follows. Let R be a disjunctive rule (that is, there are no negated atoms in the head)
A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧ ¬B1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Bn → C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cs,
where Ai , Bi and Ci are atoms, and let Y be a set of atoms. The FLP-reduct RY (the notation we use is meant to distinguish
between the FLP- and the F-reduct) is either R , if Y | A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧¬B1 ∧ · · · ∧¬Bn , or , otherwise. Given a disjunctive
program P , PY is obtained by replacing each rule R ∈ P with RY . Finally, Y is a stable model of P in the sense of Faber
et al., if Y is a minimal model of PY . Faber et al. [16] proved that “their” stable models of disjunctive programs coincide
with standard stable models. They also observed that the FLP-reduct does not depend on the syntactic form of the body of
a rule. All that matters is whether the body is satisﬁed by Y . Thus, they extended the deﬁnition to more general formulas
that are of the form
F → C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cs, (2)
where Ci are atoms and F is a propositional formula.1 That allowed them to extend the concept of a stable model to the
class of theories that consist of such “generalized” disjunctive rules. Importantly, they proved that stable models, in their
sense, of such theories are minimal models, while the stable-model semantics does not have that property. For instance, the
program (theory) E1 = {¬¬A → A} has only one FLP-stable model, ∅, but two stable models, ∅ and {A} (cf. Example 1 and
Example 3, above).
3.1. General FLP semantics
To extend that approach to arbitrary propositional theories, we ﬁrst generalize the notion of the FLP-reduct. To this end,
we follow the inductive pattern of the deﬁnition of the F-reduct. There is no change for F = ⊥, F = A, where A ∈ At, and
1 Faber et al. used conjunctions of literals and aggregate atoms as F , but that detail is immaterial here.
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Thus, the only case that requires a discussion is that of F = G → H . Once that case is settled, we will deﬁne Y to be an
FLP-stable model of a theory F if Y is a minimal model of the FLP-reduct F Y .
So, let us discuss the case of the implication. A literal reading of the FLP-reduct for rules suggests the following inductive
deﬁnition for the case F = G → H :
(G → H)Y = G → H, if Y | G; otherwise, (G → H)Y = .
However, under that choice, all occurrences of → (and so, also all occurrences of ¬) in the consequent of another im-
plication would be interpreted in the classical way. While not a problem for formulas that do not have any implications
occurring in the consequent of any “top-level” implication (and so, working correctly for the class of formulas considered
by Faber et al.), in general it leads to some counterintuitive behavior.
For instance, let F = {¬¬A} and G = {¬B → ¬¬A}, where A and B are atoms. As B does not appear in the head of the
rule of G , it must be false in every reasonable generalization of the stable-model semantics. Consequently, F and G should
have the same stable models. However, under the proposed deﬁnition it would not be so. Let Y = {A}. Since ¬¬A = (A →
⊥) → ⊥ and Y | A → ⊥, we would have F Y = {}. Consequently, Y would not be a minimal model of F Y = {} (as ∅
is a model, too) and so, Y would not be a “stable” model of F . On the other hand, as Y | ¬B , GY = {¬B → ¬¬A}. Thus,
clearly, Y would be a minimal model of GY and, consequently, a “stable” model of G . A problem in itself, it also leads to
another one. In G , A has no head occurrence (informally, there is no “deﬁning clause” for A in G), yet G would have {A} as
a “stable” model.
Thus, we need to handle the case of → differently, but in such a way that under the restriction to theories consisting of
formulas (2) we obtain the same concept of a stable model as the one proposed by Faber et al. In particular, we must ensure
that all occurrences of → in the consequent of another occurrence of → are treated consistently in the same nonclassical
way. In the remainder of this section we will argue that it can be accomplished by the following deﬁnition:
FLP4.
(G → H)Y =
⎧⎨
⎩
G → HY if Y | G and Y | H,
 if Y | G,
⊥ otherwise (that is, when Y | G → H).
While it looks different than the original deﬁnition [16], it preserves its basic idea. Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst case, when
the implication is “strongly” satisﬁed (both its antecedent and consequent are satisﬁed by Y ), we keep the antecedent
unchanged, following the spirit of the original deﬁnition of Faber et al., but replace the consequent recursively with its
reduct, to make sure the implications occurring in the antecedent are treated in a consistent way. The case when Y “weakly”
satisﬁes the implication, that is, does not satisfy its antecedent, is dealt with as in the previous naive attempt (and as in
the deﬁnition by Faber et al.). Namely, reﬂecting the principle that if the antecedent of an implication is false (informally,
the implication “does not ﬁre”), the implication is immaterial and can be replaced by  (effectively “removed”). In the
case when the implication is not satisﬁed by Y , it can be replaced by ⊥. Faber et al. do not distinguish this case and, in
fact, proceed differently. They keep the rule in the program. However, they could have replaced it with ⊥, as we propose
(following the pattern for F-reduct), without affecting the resulting concept of a stable model. Indeed, if Y does not satisfy
a rule in a program, Y cannot be a stable model of that program. Replacing a rule violated by Y with ⊥ just makes that
explicit.
To summarize, we deﬁne the FLP-reduct of the formula F with respect to Y , F Y , recursively, by using the clauses (R1)–
(R3) of the deﬁnition of the F-reduct (adjusted to the notation F Y ), as well as the clause (FLP4) for the implication →.
We extend the deﬁnition to theories in the standard way. With this deﬁnition in hand, we deﬁne next the notion of an
FLP-stable model of a propositional theory (as announced above).
Deﬁnition 1. Let F be a theory. A set of atoms Y is an FLP-stable model of F if Y is a minimal model of F Y .
Example 4. We consider again the theory E1 = {¬¬A → A} from Example 1. To compute the reduct E∅1 , we note that
∅ | ¬¬A. Thus, E∅1 = . Clearly, ∅ | E∅1 and, trivially, there is no proper subset X of ∅ such that X | E∅1 . Thus, ∅ is an
FLP-stable model of E1.
On the other hand, we have {A} | ¬¬A and {A} | A. Thus, E {A}1 = ¬¬A → A{A} . The deﬁnition implies that A{A} = A.
Thus, E {A}1 = ¬¬A → A. Clearly, {A} | E
{A}
1 . However, we also have that ∅ | E
{A}
1 . Thus, {A} is not an FLP-stable model of E1.
Example 5. Next, we reconsider the theory E2 = {(A ∨ ¬A) → A} from Example 2. To compute the reduct E∅2 , we note that
∅ | (A ∨ ¬A) → A. Thus, E∅ = ⊥. It follows, as in Example 2, that ∅ is not an FLP-stable model of E2.2
M. Truszczyn´ski / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 1285–1306 1291On the other hand, we observe that {A} | (A ∨ ¬A) and {A} | A. Thus, E {A}2 = (A ∨ ¬A) → A{A} . Since A{A} = A, it
follows that E {A}2 = (A ∨ ¬A) → A. Clearly, we have {A} | E
{A}
2 and ∅ | E
{A}
2 . Thus, {A} is an FLP-stable model of E2.
Examples 1, 2, 4 and 5 show that stable models need not be FLP-stable models and vice versa. Later, we provide a detailed
comparison between the two semantics.
3.2. Basic properties
We start with a generalization of the well-known property of the standard F-reduct of disjunctive programs (cf. Theo-
rem 2).
Proposition 1. For every theory F and for every set of atoms Y , Y | F if and only if Y | F Y .
Proof. It is enough to prove that for every formula F , we have Y | F if and only if Y | F Y . We proceed by induction. The
base cases of F = ⊥ and F = A, where A ∈ At, are evident. Let F = G ∧ H . If Y | F , then F Y = ⊥. Thus, both sides of the
equivalence are false, and the equivalence follows. If Y | F or Y | F Y , then F Y = GY ∧ HY . Since
(1) Y | F if and only if Y | G and Y | H , and
(2) Y | F Y if and only if Y | GY and Y | HY ,
the equivalence of Y | F and Y | F Y follows by the induction hypothesis. The argument for ∨ is similar. Thus, let F =
G → H . If Y | F , then F Y = ⊥ and the equivalence in the assertion holds. Similarly, if Y | G , then F Y = , and both Y | F
and Y | F Y hold. Finally, let Y | G and Y | H . In this case, F Y = G → HY . By the inductive hypothesis, Y | HY and so,
Y | G → HY . Thus, also in that case, both Y | F and Y | F Y hold. 
It follows that FLP-stable models are indeed models of formulas and theories.
Corollary 1. Let F be a theory and Y a set of atoms. If Y is an FLP-stable model of F , then Y is a model of F .
This result allows us to prove that on theories consisting of formulas of the form (2) FLP-stable models deﬁned here and
stable models of Faber et al. [16] coincide. Thus, our approach is a generalization of the one by Faber et al.
Theorem 3. Let P be a theory consisting of formulas of type (2). Then Y is a stable model of P according to the deﬁnition by Faber et
al. [16] if and only if Y is the FLP-stable model, according to Deﬁnition 1.
Proof. Let P be a theory consisting of formulas (2), and let Y be a set of atoms. For a formula R = F → C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cs
from P , we denote by R ′ and R ′′ the reducts of R with respect to Y according to Faber et al., and according to our
deﬁnition, respectively. Further, we write P ′ and P ′′ for the reducts of a program P with respect to Y according to Faber
et al., and according to our deﬁnition, respectively.
Reasoning in either direction we can assume that Y is a model of P (it is known that stable models according to
Faber et al. [16] are models; for FLP-stable models, it follows from Corollary 1). Thus, P ′ consists of those rules R = F →
C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cs , for which Y | F . In addition, it might possibly contain . The reduct P ′′ differs only in that each formula
R = F → C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cs from P that is retained in P ′ , contributes to P ′′ its reduct R ′′ = F → C ′1 ∨ · · · ∨ C ′t , where C ′1, . . . ,C ′t
are precisely those elements in {C1, . . . ,Cs} that hold in Y . In addition, as P ′ , P ′′ may also contain . It is evident, that for
every Z ⊆ Y , Z | P ′ if and only if Z | P ′′ . Thus, Y is a minimal model of P ′ if and only if Y is a minimal model of P ′′ ,
and so, the result follows. 
One of the problematic properties of the literal attempt to generalize the approach by Faber et al. was that stable models
of some theories contained atoms without head occurrences. We will now show that our generalization behaves properly
in this respect.
Proposition 2. Let F be a theory and Y an FLP-stable model of F . Then every atom in Y has a head occurrence in F .
Proof. First, we prove by induction that for every set S of atoms containing all atoms with head occurrences in a formula F ,
and for every Z ⊆ At, if Z | F then Z ∩ S | F Z . It is a stronger property than what we need below, but it is the one for
which the inductive argument can be made to work. If F = ⊥, the claim is trivially true. If F = A, then A ∈ S . Let Z be any
subset of At such that Z | F . Then, it follows that A ∈ Z and F Z = A. Thus, Z ∩ S | F Z holds, as claimed. If F = G ∧ H or
G ∨ H , then atoms with head occurrences in G (H , respectively) are contained in S . Thus, the induction hypothesis applies
to G and H (G or H , respectively), and the claim follows.
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evident. In the latter case, we have Z | H . By the induction hypothesis (it can be used as all atoms with head occurrences
in H have head occurrences in F , and so they belong to S), Z ∩ S | H Z . Thus, Z ∩ S | F Z in that case, too.
Next, we prove the result. Let S be the set of atoms with head occurrences in F . Since Y is an FLP-stable model of F ,
Y | F Y . By Proposition 1, Y | F . By the claim we proved above, Y ∩ S | F Y . Since Y is a minimal model of F Y and
Y ∩ S ⊆ Y , Y ∩ S = Y and, consequently, Y ⊆ S . 
Finally, we state and prove two properties that we use later in the paper.
Proposition 3. For every formulas F and G, and for every set of atoms Y :
(1) F Y ≡ ⊥ if and only if Y | F ;
(2) (F ◦ G)Y ≡ F Y ◦ GY , where ◦ = ∧ or ∨.
Proof. (1) We proceed by induction. The cases F = ⊥ and F = A, where A ∈ At, are straightforward. Thus, let us assume
that F = G ∧ H . First, we consider the case when Y | F . In that case, F Y = ⊥ and the “if ” part of the assertion follows.
Conversely, let Y | F . Then, Y | G and Y | H . By Proposition 1, Y | GY and Y | HY . Thus, Y | GY ∧ HY . Since in such
case F Y = GY ∧ HY , it follows that Y | F Y and so, F Y ≡ ⊥. Thus, the “only if” part of the equivalence holds, too. The case
of ∨ is essentially the same.
It remains to consider the case F = G → H . For the “if” part, as before, it suﬃces to notice that if Y | F , then F Y = ⊥.
Conversely, let Y | F .
Case 1. Y | G . Then, F Y =  and so, F Y ≡ ⊥.
Case 2. Y | G . Since Y | F , Y | H follows. Consequently, F Y = G → HY . In addition, by Proposition 1, Y | HY . Thus,
Y | F Y and F Y ≡ ⊥.
(2) We consider the case ◦ = ∧ only. The case ◦ = ∨ is similar. If Y | F ∧ G then (F ∧ G)Y and F Y ∧ GY are equal! Thus,
let us assume that Y | F ∧ G . It follows that (F ∧ G)Y = ⊥. Moreover, we have Y | F or Y | G . By (1), F Y ≡ ⊥ or GY ≡ ⊥.
Thus, F Y ∧ GY ≡ ⊥, and the claim follows. 
3.3. Minimal-model property
The main objective of Faber et al. [16] was to generalize the stable-model semantics to the class of theories consisting of
rules of the form (2) so that stable models would be minimal models. Faber et al. proved that their generalization indeed
has that property.
The extended FLP semantics has the minimal-model property for a broad class of theories, including those consisting of
rules (2), but not in general.
Example 6. Let F = ¬A ∨ A and Y = ∅. Since Y | A → ⊥ and Y | A, (¬A)Y = (A → ⊥)Y = . Moreover, AY = ⊥. Thus,
F Y ≡ (¬A)Y ∨ AY ≡ . Clearly, Y is a minimal model of F Y and so, an FLP-stable model of F . Next, let us consider Z = {A}.
We now have (¬A)Z = (A → ⊥)Z = ⊥ and AZ = A. Thus, F Z ≡ (¬A)Z ∨ AZ ≡ A. Again, Z is a minimal model of F Z and so,
an FLP-stable model of F . Thus, FLP-stable models of F do not form an antichain and Z is not a minimal model of F .
To describe a broad class of theories for which FLP-stable models are minimal models, we introduce monotone and
disjunctive-monotone formulas.
Deﬁnition 2. A formula F is monotone if for every X ⊆ Y ⊆ At, X | F implies Y | F . A formula F is disjunctive-monotone if
every occurrence of ∨ in F operates on monotone formulas.
We note that a disjunctive-monotone formula does not have to be monotone. For instance, A ∧ ¬C is disjunctive-
monotone (as it contains no occurrence of ∨) but not monotone. Similarly, a monotone formula is not necessarily
disjunctive-monotone. For instance,  ∨ ¬A is monotone but not disjunctive monotone.
Proposition 4. For every disjunctive-monotone formula F and every sets of atoms X and Y such that X ⊆ Y , if X | F and Y | F
then X | F Y .
Proof. We proceed by induction. The case of F = ⊥ is vacuously true. If F = A, where A is an atom, then F Y = A = F (it
follows from the assumption that Y | A). Thus, X | F Y (as X | F ). For the inductive step, there are three cases to consider.
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X | H , Y | G and Y | H . By the induction hypothesis, X | GY and X | HY . Consequently, X | GY ∧ HY = (G∧ H)Y = F Y .
Case 2. F = G ∨ H . Since X | F , X | G or X | H . Without loss of generality, we may assume that X | G . Since F is
disjunctive-monotone, G is disjunctive-monotone. Moreover, G is monotone. Thus, Y | G . By the induction hypothesis,
X | GY . Since F Y = GY ∨ HY , X | F Y .
Case 3. F = G → H . Since Y | F , F Y = ⊥. If F Y =  then X | F Y = . If, on the other hand, Y | G , Y | H and F Y = G →
HY , then there are two cases to consider. If X | G , then X | F Y . If X | G , then X | H . Since H is disjunctive-monotone
(as F is), by induction it holds that X | HY . Thus, X | F Y in that case, too. 
Corollary 2. Let F be a theory such that every formula in F is of the form H or G → H, where H is disjunctive-monotone. For every
X ⊆ Y ⊆ At, if X | F and Y | F , then X | F Y .
Proof. To prove the result, it suﬃces to prove it for each formula F in F . If F is disjunctive-monotone, then the result
follows from Proposition 4. If F = G → H , where H is disjunctive-monotone, we reason as follows. Since Y | F , we have
F Y = ; or Y | G , Y | H and F Y = G → HY . In the ﬁrst case, X | F Y is evident. In the second case, if X | G , the assertion
follows. Otherwise, since X | F , X | H . By Proposition 4, X | HY follows. Consequently, X | F Y follows, as well. 
Proposition 4 and Corollary 2 imply that for the class of theories of the type considered in Corollary 2, FLP-stable models
are minimal.
Corollary 3. Let F be a theory such that every formula in F is of the form H or G → H, where H is disjunctive-monotone. If Y is an
FLP-stable model of F then Y is a minimal model of F .
Proof. Since Y is a model of F Y , Y is a model of F (Proposition 1). Let us assume that X | F and X ⊆ Y . By Corollary 2,
X | F Y . Since Y is a minimal model of F Y , X = Y . Thus, Y is a minimal model of F . 
Corollary 3 extends the result by Faber et al., as it applies in particular to theories consisting of formulas of type (2). It
can be generalized further to the case, where each formula in a theory is of the form Hk → (Hk−1 → (· · · → (H1 → H0) · · ·)),
where k 0 and H0 is disjunctive monotone. The argument is essentially the same.
3.4. Computational complexity for FLP semantics
It is well known that the truth value of a formula in an interpretation can be found in polynomial time. It follows that
given a formula and a set of atoms Y , one can compute F Y in polynomial time by means of a simple recursive algorithm
that directly follows the deﬁnition of the reduct. Further, we have that the problem to decide whether a model of a formula
is a minimal model is in the class coNP (in fact, one can show it is coNP-complete). Indeed, the complementary problem,
to decide whether a given model of a formula is not a minimal one is in NP (a model properly contained in the given
one serves as a witness). Thus, the problem to decide whether a formula has an FLP-stable model is in the class Σ P2 .
The completeness of the problem for the class Σ P2 follows from the fact that on disjunctive programs FLP-stable models
coincide with stable models [16], and the existence problem for stable models is Σ P2 -complete [15]. Consequently, deciding
the existence of an FLP-stable model is Σ P2 -complete, too. We state that result below, together with two other related results
that can be proved by similar arguments.
Theorem 4. The problem of the existence of an FLP-stable model is Σ P2 -complete. Skeptical reasoning with FLP-stable models (is a
given atom a member of every FLP-stable model) is Π P2 -complete. Brave reasoning with FLP-stable models (is a given atom a member
of some FLP-stable model) is Σ P2 -complete.
3.5. HT-interpretations and FLP semantics — strong equivalence
We now describe FLP-stable models in terms of HT-interpretations, and apply that result to characterize strong equiva-
lence with respect to the FLP semantics. First, we deﬁne a certain satisﬁability relation |ﬂp between HT-interpretations and
formulas. The deﬁnition is inductive and follows the same pattern as that for |ht . The cases 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F for F = ⊥, F = A,
where A ∈ At, F = G ∧ H and G ∨ H , are handled as in the case of |ht . For the implication we have the following clause:
5′ . 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp G → H if Y | G → H ; and Y | G , or X | G , or 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp H .
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we say that 〈X, Y 〉 is an FLP-model of F (not to be confused with an FLP-stable model).
We have the following simple property of |ﬂp , mirroring a similar one for |ht (cf. Theorem 1).
Theorem 5. For every formula F and every sets X ⊆ Y ⊆ At:
(1) 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F implies Y | F ;
(2) 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp ¬F if and only if Y | F ;
(3) 〈Y , Y 〉 |ﬂp F if and only if Y | F .
Proof. (1) The case F = ⊥ is evident. If F = A, where A ∈ At, and 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F , then A ∈ X . Thus, A ∈ Y and Y | F . The
inductive step for F = G ∧ H and F = G ∨ H is standard. If F = G → H and 〈X, Y 〉 | F then, in particular, Y | F (by the
deﬁnition of |ﬂp for the case of implication). Thus, the claim follows.
(2) By the deﬁnition, 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp ¬F if and only if Y | ¬F , and Y | F or X | F or 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp ⊥. Thus, 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp ¬F if
and only if Y | ¬F and the claim follows.
(3) We show only the argument in the inductive step for the case F = G → H (the basis and all other cases are straight-
forward). First, by the deﬁnition, if 〈Y , Y 〉 |ﬂp F then Y | F . Conversely, if Y | F , then Y | G or Y | H . By the induction
hypothesis, Y | H is equivalent to 〈Y , Y 〉 |ﬂp H . Thus, 〈Y , Y 〉 |ﬂp F . 
Similarly as the relation |ht and the F-reduct, the |ﬂp relation and the FLP-reduct are closely connected (cf. Theorem 2).
Theorem 6. For every formula F and for every two sets of atoms X ⊆ Y , X | F Y if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F .
Proof. We proceed by induction. The case when F = ⊥ is straightforward. Let F = A, where A ∈ At. If X | AY , then AY = ⊥.
Thus, AY = A. It follows that X | A and so, 〈X, Y 〉 | A. Conversely, if 〈X, Y 〉 | A, then X | A. Since X ⊆ Y , Y | A. Thus,
AY = A and X | AY as required.
Next, let F = G ∧ H . If X | (G ∧ H)Y , then (G ∧ H)Y = GY ∧ HY . Thus, X | GY and X | HY . By the induc-
tive hypothesis, 〈X, Y 〉 | G and 〈X, Y 〉 | H . Thus, 〈X, Y 〉 | G ∧ H , as needed. Conversely, let 〈X, Y 〉 | G ∧ H . Then
〈X, Y 〉 | G and 〈X, Y 〉 | H and, by the inductive hypothesis, X | GY and X | HY . Thus, X | GY ∧ HY . By Proposition 3,
GY ∧ HY ≡ (G ∧ H)Y . Thus, X | (G ∧ H)Y .
The argument for the case F = G ∨ H is similar. Thus, we move on to the case F = G → H . We have the following
equivalences:
(1) X | (G → H)Y ;
(2) Y | G; or Y | G and Y | H , and X | G → HY ;
(3) Y | G; or Y | H and X | G → HY ;
(4) Y | G or Y | H ; and Y | G or X | G → HY ;
(5) Y | G → H ; and Y | G or X | G , or X | HY ;
(6) Y | G → H ; and Y | G or X | G , or 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp H .
The last statement is equivalent to 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F and the result follows. 
Theorem 6 is the key to a characterization of FLP-stable models in terms of the relation |ﬂp .
Corollary 4. Let F be a theory and Y a set of atoms. Then Y is an FLP-stable model of F if and only if 〈Y , Y 〉 |ﬂp F and for every
X ⊂ Y , 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F .
Proof. By the deﬁnition, Y is an FLP-stable model of F if and only if Y | F Y and, for every X ⊂ Y , X | F Y . We apply
Theorem 6. The former condition is equivalent to 〈Y , Y 〉 |ﬂp F . The latter one can be stated equivalently as: for every
X ⊂ Y , 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F . Thus, the assertion follows. 
Example 7. Let us consider the theory E2 = {(A ∨ ¬A) → A} from Example 2. Let Y = ∅. Then Y | (A ∨ ¬A) → A, and so,
〈Y , Y 〉 |ﬂp E2. Thus, in agreement with our results, Y = ∅ is not an FLP-stable model of E2.
For Z = {A}, the situation is different. First, we note that now Z | (A ∨ ¬A) → A and 〈Z , Z〉 |ﬂp A (as A ∈ Z ). Thus,
〈Z , Z〉 |ﬂp (A ∨¬A) → A and so, 〈Z , Z〉 |ﬂp E2. Clearly, X = ∅ is the only proper subset of Z and 〈X, Z〉 |ﬂp (A ∨¬A) → A
(indeed, we have Z | A ∨ ¬A, X | A ∨ ¬A and 〈X, Z〉 |ﬂp A (as A /∈ X )). According to Corollary 4, {A} is an FLP-stable
model of E2 (as we already established by means of the reduct-based deﬁnition in Example 2).
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equivalent if for every theory H, the theories F ∪H and G ∪H have the same FLP-stable models. This is a literal adaptation
of the standard deﬁnition of strong equivalence [32] to the case of FLP-stable models.
Theorem 7. Let F and G be two formulas. Then, F and G are strongly FLP-equivalent if and only if F and G have the same FLP-models.
Proof. (⇐) For every theory H, 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F ∪ H if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp G ∪ H. By Corollary 4, F ∪ H and G ∪ H have
the same FLP-stable models.
(⇒) Let us assume that there are X ⊆ Y ⊆ At such that 〈X, Y 〉 satisﬁes one of F and G but not the other. Without loss
of generality, we may assume that 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F and 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp G . By Theorem 6, it follows that X | F Y and X | GY . The
ﬁrst property implies that F Y ≡ ⊥. Consequently, by Proposition 3, Y | F . By Proposition 1, Y | F Y .
Case 1. Y | GY . It follows that 〈Y , Y 〉 |ﬂp G . Thus, Y | G and for every H, Y | G ∪ H. Thus, Y is not an FLP-stable model
of G ∪H. Let us now deﬁne H = Y . We have (F ∪H)Y ≡ F Y ∪HY . Moreover, HY = H. Thus, (F ∪H)Y ≡ F Y ∪H. It follows
that (a) Y | (F ∪ H)Y , and (b) there is no X ⊂ Y such that X | (F ∪ H)Y . Thus, Y is an FLP-stable model of F ∪ H. As we
noted, Y is not an FLP-stable model of G ∪ H. Thus, F and G are not strongly FLP-equivalent, a contradiction.
Case 2. Y | GY . We recall that X | GY . Thus, X ⊂ Y . We deﬁne
H = X ∪ {A → B | A, B ∈ Y \ X}.
We have (F ∪ H)Y ≡ F Y ∪ HY . Moreover, it is easy to check that HY = H. Thus, (F ∪ H)Y ≡ F Y ∪ H. We recall that
X | F Y . We also have X | H. Thus, X | (F ∪ H)Y and so, Y is not an FLP-model of F ∪ H. Since (G ∪ H)Y ≡ GY ∪ H,
Y | GY , and Y | H, we have Y | (G ∪ H)Y . Let Z ⊂ Y be such that Z | GY ∪ H. Since Z | H, Z = X . However, X | GY ,
a contradiction. Thus, Y is a minimal model of (G ∪ H)Y and so a stable model of G ∪ H. This contradicts our assumption
that F and G are FLP-equivalent. Consequently, F and G have the same FLP-models. 
4. Normal forms and a comparison with stable-model semantics
The following result was obtained by Cabalar and Ferraris [8]. It concerns representing theories by programs — theories
consisting of rules (formulas of the form (1)).
Theorem 8. For every theory F there is a program G (in the same language) such that F and G have the same HT-models (are
equivalent in the logic HT).
In other words, every theory F is strongly equivalent to some program G . A similar result holds for the FLP-models and,
in fact, it can be obtained by means of a very similar argument to that used by Cabalar and Ferraris [8]. In what follows
we write ¬Y for {¬y | y ∈ Y }. We ﬁrst state and prove three auxiliary results (analogous to results proved by Cabalar and
Ferraris [8] for HT-countermodels).
Proposition 5. Let X ⊂ Y ⊆ Z be ﬁnite. Then 〈U , V 〉, where U ⊆ V ⊆ Z , is an FLP-countermodel of∧ X ∧∧¬Y →∨ X ∨∨¬Y
(where the set complements X and Y are deﬁned with respect to Z ) if and only if U = X and V = Y .
Proof. Let us denote
∧
X ∧∧¬Y →∨ X ∨∨¬Y by F . Since Y \ X = ∅, there is a ∈ Y \ X . It follows that a ∨ ¬a is a
subformula of
∨
X ∨∨¬Y . Thus, F is a propositional tautology.
Let us consider a pair 〈U , V 〉, where U ⊆ V . Due to the observation above, 〈U , V 〉 is an FLP-countermodel of F if and
only if
V |
∧
X ∧
∧
¬Y , U |
∧
X ∧
∧
¬Y , and 〈U , V 〉 |ﬂp
∨
X ∨
∨
¬Y .
Moreover, from the deﬁnition, one can check that 〈U , V 〉 |ﬂp
∨
X ∨∨¬Y if and only if U |∨ X and V |∨¬Y .
Now, since U |∧ X and U |∨ X , X ⊆ U and U ∩ X = ∅. Thus, U = X . Since V |∧¬Y and V |∨¬Y , V ⊆ Y and
Y ⊆ V . Thus, V = Y .
Conversely, if U = X and V = Y then V |∧ X ∧∧¬Y , U |∧ X ∧∧¬Y , U |∨ X and V |∨¬Y . Thus, 〈U , V 〉 is an
FLP-countermodel of F . 
Proposition 6. Let Y ⊆ Z be ﬁnite. Then 〈U , V 〉, where U ⊆ V ⊆ Z , is an FLP-countermodel to ∧ Y ∧∧¬Y → ⊥ (where the set
complement Y is deﬁned with respect to Z ) if and only if V = Y .
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Y ∧∧¬Y and U | Y ∧∧¬Y . The condition (1) is equivalent to V = Y . The condition (2) is equivalent to U = V = Y . Thus
the disjunction of the two conditions is equivalent to V = Y , as required. 
Proposition 7. Let F be a formula. If 〈Y , Y 〉 is an FLP-countermodel of F , then for every X ⊆ Y , 〈X, Y 〉 is an FLP-countermodel of F .
Proof. If 〈Y , Y 〉 is an FLP-countermodel of F , then Y | F Y (Theorem 6) and so, Y | F (Proposition 1). Consequently, by
Theorem 5, 〈X, Y 〉 is an FLP-countermodel of F . 
Theorem 9. Let F be a theory. There exists a program G such that F and G have the same FLP-models.
Proof. For F ∈ F , we consider FLP-countermodels 〈X, Y 〉 of F such that Y ⊆ At(F ). For each FLP-countermodel 〈X, Y 〉 with
X = Y , we take the formula deﬁned in Proposition 5 (with Z = At(F )). For each countermodel 〈X, Y 〉 such that X = Y , we
take the formula from Proposition 6. We take for G the set of all rules constructed in that way from countermodels of
formulas in F . By Proposition 7, F and G have the same FLP-countermodels consisting of atoms in At(F) and so, the same
FLP-models consisting of atoms in At(F). Thus, they have the same FLP-models. 
We saw (Examples 1–2 and 4–5) that the semantics of stable and FLP-stable models are different and neither is stronger
than the other one. However, each can be expressed in terms of the other one. To see that, we ﬁrst observe that HT- and
FLP-models of rules coincide.
Proposition 8. Let R be a rule. Then, R has the same HT- and FLP-models.
Proof. Let R =∧ A ∧∧¬B →∨C ∨∨¬D . Directly from the deﬁnition, it follows that 〈X, Y 〉 |ht R if and only if Y | R;
and X ∩ A = ∅ or B ⊆ Y or C ⊆ X or Y ∩ D = ∅.
Similarly, 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp R if and only if Y | R; and X ∩ A = ∅ or B ⊆ X or Y ∩ A = ∅ or B ⊆ Y or C ⊆ X or Y ∩ D = ∅. Since
X ∩ A = ∅ or Y ∩ A = ∅ if and only if X ∩ A = ∅, and B ⊆ X or B ⊆ Y if and only if B ⊆ Y , the result follows. 
Theorems 8 and 9 yield now the following two corollaries relating the two semantics.
Corollary 5. For every theory F there are programs Fht and F f lp such that
(1) 〈X, Y 〉 is an HT-model of F if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 is an FLP-model of Fht ;
(2) 〈X, Y 〉 is an FLP-model of F if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 is an HT-model of F f lp .
Proof. It is enough to take for Fht and F f lp programs guaranteed by Theorems 8 and 9, respectively. 
Thus the meaning of any theory F under HT-models is captured by FLP-models of the normal form Fht of F that is
assured by Theorem 8. Similarly, the meaning of any theory F under FLP-models is captured by HT-models of the normal
form F f lp of F given by Theorem 9. As another corollary we state a result relating stable and FLP-stable models of F , Fht
and F f lp .
Corollary 6. For every theory F :
(1) Y is a stable model of F if and only if Y is an FLP-stable model of Fht ;
(2) Y is an FLP-stable model of F if and only if Y is a stable model of F f lp .
We mention that recently Lee and Meng [29] obtained a result related to Corollary 6(2) but restricted to formulas that are
programs with aggregates. Namely, they showed that a program, say F , as considered by Faber et al. [16] (and so, possibly
with aggregates in the bodies of rules), can be compiled into propositional formula FLP(F) so that FLP-stable answer sets
of P correspond to stable models of FLP(F).
We close by pointing out a drawback of the FLP semantics. Namely, the operator of ↔ does not function, in general, as
the operator of explicit deﬁnition.2 For instance, if we introduce a new atom B , then the theory E ′1 = {¬B → A,¬A ↔ B}
(we obtain it from E1 by replacing ¬A with B and adding the “deﬁnition” ¬A ↔ B) has two FLP-stable models,
{B} and {A}, while the original theory E1 has only one FLP-stable model, {A} (and, in particular, no counterpart to the
stable model {B}).
2 This aspect of the FLP semantics was pointed out by one of the reviewers.
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The approach that yielded generalizations of stable and FLP-stable model semantics for arbitrary propositional theories
can also be applied to the supported-model semantics.
5.1. The reduct for the supported-model semantics
For a formula F and a set of atoms X , we deﬁne the SPP-reduct of F with respect to Y , written as F Y , by adapting to
the new notation the inductive clauses (R1)–(R3), and using the following deﬁnition for the implication:
SPP4.
(G → H)Y =
⎧⎨
⎩
HY if Y | G and Y | H,
 if Y | G,
⊥ otherwise.
This notion of reduct is motivated by the deﬁnition of supported models in the case of programs with disjunctive rules
[6,27]. We recall that deﬁnition. Let P be a disjunctive program. The supp-reduct of P with respect to a set of atoms Y ,
P (Y ), is the set of the heads of those rules in P whose body is satisﬁed by Y . A set of atoms Y is a supported model of P if
Y is a minimal model of P (Y ).
The basic idea behind P (Y ) is to drop the antecedent of a rule if the antecedent is satisﬁed by Y . We adopt that idea in
the deﬁnition of the SPP-reduct. However, in the ﬁrst case of the deﬁnition, we set the reduct (G → H)Y to be HY rather
than H due to the same reasons we discussed when generalizing the FLP-reduct. With the deﬁnition of the reduct in hand,
the deﬁnition of a supported model is standard.
Deﬁnition 3. Let F be a theory. A set of atoms Y is a supported model of F if Y is a minimal model of F Y .
Example 8. We will one more time consider theories E1 = {¬¬A → A} and E2 = {(A ∨ ¬A) → A} from Examples 1 and 2,
respectively. First, let Y = ∅. Clearly, we have Y | ¬¬A. Thus, EY1 = . It follows that Y | E1 and, as Y = ∅, Y is a supported
model of E1 being trivially a minimal model of EY1 . On the other hand, Y | (A ∨ ¬A) → A. Thus, E
Y
2 = ⊥ and Y is not a
supported model of E2.
Next, let Z = {A}. Then, Z | ¬¬A and Z | A. Thus, E Z1 = (¬¬A → A)Z = AZ = A. It follows that Z is a supported model
of E1. Similarly, Z | (A ∨ ¬A) and Z | A. Thus, E Z2 = ((A ∨ ¬A) → A)Z = AZ = A, and Z is a supported model of E2, too.
The results and the proofs that worked in the case of stable and FLP semantics work, with only minor changes (and
with one exception) in the case of supported models, too. We start by gathering in one result several basic properties of the
SPP-reduct and supported models.
Proposition 9. For every theory F and every set of atoms Y :
(1) Y | F if and only if Y | F Y ;
(2) Y | F if and only if F Y ≡ ⊥;
(3) If Y is a supported model of F , then Y is a model of F ;
(4) If Y is a supported model of F , then every atom in Y has a head occurrence in F .
Proof. (1) It is enough to consider the case when F consists of a single formula F . We proceed by structural induction. The
base cases of F = ⊥ and F = A, where A ∈ At, are straightforward. Let us consider F = G ∧ H . If Y | F , then F Y = ⊥. Thus,
both sides of the equivalence are false, and the equivalence follows. If Y | F , then F Y = GY ∧ HY . By the deﬁnition and the
inductive hypothesis, the following statements are equivalent:
Y | F ,
Y | G ∧ H,
Y | G, and Y | H,
Y | GY and Y | HY ,
Y | GY ∧ HY ,
Y | F Y .
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the equivalence in the assertion holds. Similarly, if Y | G , then F Y = , and both Y | F and Y | F Y hold. Finally, let us
assume that Y | G and Y | H . In this case, F Y = HY . By the inductive hypothesis, Y | HY and so, Y | F Y . Thus, also in
that case, both Y | F and Y | F Y hold.
(2) As before, it is enough to consider the case when F consists of a single formula F . If Y | F then (1) implies that
F Y ≡ ⊥. We prove the converse implication by induction. If F = ⊥, then the implication is trivially true. If F = A, where
A is an atom, then F Y = A (as the assumption excludes the only other possibility that F Y = ⊥). It follows that A ∈ Y and
so, Y | F . Next, let F = G ∧ H . Since F Y ≡ ⊥, F Y = GY ∧ HY . Moreover, GY ≡ ⊥ and HY ≡ ⊥. By the induction hypothesis,
Y | G and Y | H . Thus, Y | F . The case F = G ∨ H is similar. Finally, if F = G → H , we have that either Y | G , or Y | G ,
Y | H and F Y = HY . In either case, Y | F .
(3) Follows from (1) and from the deﬁnition of a supported model.
(4) We ﬁrst show that for every formula F and every set of atoms S containing all atoms with head occurrences in F , if
Y ⊆ At and Y | F then Y ∩ S | F Y . We proceed by induction. If F = ⊥, the claim is trivially true. If F = A, then A ∈ S . If
Y | F , then A ∈ Y and F Y = A. Thus, the claim follows. If F = G ∧ H or G ∨ H , then Y | G and (or, respectively) Y | H .
Moreover, atoms with head occurrences in G are contained in S and the same holds for H . Thus, the induction hypothesis
applies to G and H . Consequently, we have Y ∩ S | G and (or, respectively) Y ∩ S | H , and the claim follows.
Finally, let F = G → H . Since Y | F , F Y = , or Y | G , Y | H and F Y = HY . In the ﬁrst case, the assertion is evident.
In the latter case, we have Y | H . By the induction hypothesis (it applies, as every atom with a head occurrence in H has
a head occurrence in F and so, it belongs to S), Y ∩ S | HY . Thus, Y ∩ S | F Y in that case, too.
We are ready to prove the assertion (4). Let S be the set of atoms with head occurrences in F . Since Y is a supported
model of F , Y | F Y . By (1), Y | F . Thus, by the property proved above, Y ∩ S | F Y . Since Y is a minimal model of F Y ,
and Y ∩ S ⊆ Y , Y ∩ S = Y . Consequently, Y ⊆ S . 
We now observe that our concept of a supported model indeed generalizes that of a disjunctive program [6].
Theorem 10. Let P be a disjunctive program. Then, Y ⊆ At is a supported model of P according to our deﬁnition if and only if Y is a
supported model according to the original deﬁnition of supported models of disjunctive logic programs.
Proof. If Y is a supported model according to either deﬁnition, Y is a model of P . Using this observation, as well as the
deﬁnitions of the corresponding reducts, one can show that H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hk ∈ P Y if and only if k  1 and there are atoms
Hk+1, . . . , Hm such that Hi /∈ Y , k + 1  i  m, and H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hk ∨ Hk+1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hm ∈ P (Y ). Let us assume that Y is a
supported model of P according to the original deﬁnition. It follows that Y is a minimal model of P (Y ). By the observation
above, Y is a model of P Y . If Z ⊆ Y is a model of P Y , then Z is a model of P (Y ) (again, by the observation above, we have
that P Y classically entails P (Y )). Thus, Z = Y and Y is a minimal model of P Y . Consequently, Y is a supported model of P
according to our deﬁnition.
Conversely, let Y be a supported model of P according to our deﬁnition. Then, Y is a minimal model of P Y . Since P Y
classically entails P (Y ), Y is a model of P (Y ). Let Z ⊆ Y be a model of P (Y ). Let H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hk ∈ P Y . By the observation
above, there are atoms Hk+1, . . . , Hm such that Hi /∈ Y , k+ 1 i m, and H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hk ∨ Hk+1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hm ∈ P (Y ). It follows
that Hi /∈ Z , k + 1 i m. Since Z is a model of P (Y ), it follows that Z is a model of H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hk . Thus, Z is a model of
P Y and, consequently, Z = Y . Thus, Y is a minimal model of P (Y ) and so, a supported model of P according to the original
deﬁnition. 
5.2. HT-interpretations and supported models
Next, we characterize supported models in terms of a certain satisﬁability relation that connects HT-interpretations and
formulas. It follows closely the deﬁnitions of |ht and |ﬂp but is modiﬁed for the case of the implication.
5′′ . 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G → H if Y | G → H , and Y | G or 〈X, Y 〉 |spp H .
If 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F , we say that 〈X, Y 〉 is an SPP-model of F .
Our next result gathers together some simple properties of the relation |spp that mirror those of |ht and |ﬂp .
Theorem 11. For every formula F and every sets X ⊆ Y ⊆ At:
(1) 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F implies Y | F ;
(2) 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬F if and only if Y | F ;
(3) 〈Y , Y 〉 |spp F if and only if Y | F .
Proof. (1) We proceed by induction. The claim is evident for F = ⊥. If F = A, where A is an atom, 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F implies
that A ∈ X . Thus, A ∈ Y and Y | F . If F = G ∧ H , then 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F implies 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G and 〈X, Y 〉 |spp H . By the
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let F = G → H . By the deﬁnition, if 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F then Y | F . Thus, the result follows.
(2) By the deﬁnition, 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬F if and only if Y | ¬F and Y | F . Thus, the claim follows.
(3) The argument is similar. The inductive step for the case F = G → H (the basis and all other cases are straightforward)
is as follows. First, by the deﬁnition, if 〈Y , Y 〉 |spp F then Y | F . Conversely, if Y | F , then Y | G or Y | H . By the
induction hypothesis, Y | G or 〈Y , Y 〉 |spp H . Since Y | F (= G → H), 〈Y , Y 〉 |spp F follows. 
The following result is analogous to similar results for |ht and |ﬂp , and ties the SPP-reduct and the relation |spp
(cf. Theorems 2 and 6).
Theorem 12. For every theory F and for every two sets of atoms X ⊆ Y , X | F Y if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F .
Proof. It is enough to prove the result for a single formula F . We proceed by induction. The case when F = ⊥ is straight-
forward. Let F = A, where A ∈ At. If X | AY , then AY = ⊥. Thus, AY = A. It follows that X | A and so, 〈X, Y 〉 |spp A.
Conversely, if 〈X, Y 〉 |spp A, then X | A. Since X ⊆ Y , Y | A. Thus, AY = A and X | AY as required.
Next, let F = G ∧ H . If X | (G ∧ H)Y , then (G ∧ H)Y = GY ∧ HX . Thus, X | GY and X | HY . By the inductive hypothesis,
〈X, Y 〉 |spp G and 〈X, Y 〉 |spp H . Thus, 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G ∧ H , as needed. Conversely, let 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G ∧ H . Then 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G
and 〈X, Y 〉 |spp H . By the inductive hypothesis, we have X | GY and X | HY . Thus, X | GY ∧ HY . Clearly, GY ≡ ⊥ and
HY ≡ ⊥. By Proposition 9(2), Y | G and Y | H . Thus, Y | G ∧ H and so, (G ∧ H)Y = GY ∧ HY . Hence, X | (F ∧ G)Y .
The argument for the case F = G ∨ H is similar. And so, let us move on to the case F = G → H . We have the following
equivalences:
X | (G → H)Y ,
Y | G; or Y | G and Y | H, and X | HY ,
Y | G; or Y | H and X | HY ,
Y | G or Y | H; and Y | G or X | HY ,
Y | G → H; and Y | G or 〈X, Y 〉 |spp H,
〈X, Y 〉 |spp F .
Thus, the result follows. 
The main consequence of Theorem 12 is a characterization of supported models in terms of the relation |spp .
Corollary 7. Let F be a theory and Y a set of atoms. Then Y is a supported model of F if and only if 〈Y , Y 〉 |spp F and for every
X ⊂ Y , 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F .
Proof. By the deﬁnition, Y is a supported model of F if and only if Y | F Y , and for every X ⊂ Y , X | F Y . We now apply
Theorem 12. The former condition is equivalent to 〈Y , Y 〉 |spp F . The latter one is equivalent to the property that for every
X ⊂ Y , 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F . Thus, the assertion follows. 
5.3. Strong equivalence with respect to supported models
We will now study the strong equivalence of theories with respect to the supported-model semantics. Two theories F
and G are strongly SPP-equivalent if for every theory H, F ∪ H and G ∪ H have the same supported models. Corollary 7
implies that if F and G have the same SPP-models then they are strongly SPP-equivalent. Unlike in the case of stable or
FLP-stable semantics, though, that condition is not necessary. A weaker condition provides a characterization of strong SPP-
equivalence. An SPP-model is essential if it is of the form 〈Y , Y 〉 or 〈Y \ {A}, Y 〉, where A ∈ At. Having the same essential
SPP-models is suﬃcient and necessary for F and G to be strongly SPP-equivalent. To prove it, we need a simple auxiliary
property.
Proposition 10. For every formula F and for every interpretation Y , F Y is monotone.
Proof. Clearly, if F = ⊥, F Y is trivially monotone. If F = A, where A ∈ At and X | F Y , then F Y = A and A ∈ X . Thus, for
every Z , if X ⊆ Z , Z | F Y .
Let us assume that F = G ∧ H and that X | F Y . Since F Y = GY ∧ HY (we note that F Y = ⊥), X | GY and X | HY .
Let Z be an interpretation such that X ⊆ Z . By the induction hypothesis, Z | GY and Z | HY . Thus, Z | GY ∧ HY and so,
Z | F Y . The case of F = G ∨ H is similar.
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for every interpretation Z such that X ⊆ Z , Z | F Y . If F Y = HY , then X | HY and, by the induction hypothesis, for every
interpretation Z such that X ⊆ Z , Z | HY . Thus, in either case, if X ⊆ Z , then Z | F Y . 
We now have the following characterization of strong SPP-equivalence. Unlike the one developed for programs [49],
where the general case is established through a certain reduction to normal programs, the present characterization is direct.
Theorem 13. Let F and G be two theories. Then, F and G are strongly SPP-equivalent if and only if F and G have the same essential
SPP-models.
Proof. (⇒) Let 〈Y , Y 〉 be an essential SPP-model of F . It follows that Y | F Y ∪ Y = (F ∪ Y )Y . Moreover, Y is a minimal
model of F Y ∪ Y = (F ∪ Y )Y . Consequently, Y is a supported model of F ∪ Y . By the assumption, Y is a supported model
of G ∪ Y . Thus, Y is a model of G and so, by Proposition 9, Y | GY . By Theorem 12, it follows that 〈Y , Y 〉 is an SPP-model
of G .
Next, let 〈Y \ {a}, Y 〉 be an essential SPP-model of F . It follows that Y \ {a} | F Y . By Proposition 10, Y | F Y . Thus,
〈Y , Y 〉 is an SPP-model of F . By the argument given above, 〈Y , Y 〉 is an SPP-model of G . By Proposition 9, Y | GY . Thus,
Y | GY ∪ (Y \ {a}) = (G ∪ (Y \ {a}))Y . Let us assume that 〈Y \ {a}, Y 〉 is not an SPP-model of G . Then, Y \ {a} | GY . Since
every model of (G ∪ (Y \ {a}))Y = GY ∪ (Y \ {a}) contains Y \ {a}, and Y \ {a} | GY , it follows that Y is a minimal model of
(G ∪ (Y \ {a}))Y . Thus, Y is a supported model of G ∪ (Y \ {a}). Consequently, it is a supported model of F ∪ (Y \ {a}). But
Y \ {a} | (F ∪ (Y \ {a}))Y , a contradiction. Thus, 〈Y \ {a}, Y 〉 is an SPP-model of G . By symmetry, it follows that essential
SPP-models of F and G coincide.
(⇐) Let H be any theory and let Y be a supported model of F ∪ H. It follows that 〈Y , Y 〉 is an SPP-model of F
and of H. By the assumption, 〈Y , Y 〉 is an SPP-model of G and of H. Thus, 〈Y , Y 〉 |spp G ∪ H. Let X ⊂ Y be such that
X | (G ∪ H)Y . It follows that X | GY and X | HY . Let a ∈ Y \ X (such an a exists). Then, by Proposition 10, Y \ {a} | GY
and Y \ {a} | HY . Thus, 〈Y \ {a}, Y 〉 is an SPP-model of G and so, of F . It follows that Y \ {a} | F Y and, consequently, that
Y \ {a} | F Y ∪ HY ≡ (F ∧ H)Y . This is a contradiction with Y being a supported model of F ∪ H. Thus, Y is a minimal
model of (G ∪ H)Y and so, Y is a supported model of G ∪ H. By symmetry, F ∪ H and G ∪ H have the same supported
models. Thus, they are strongly SPP-equivalent. 
5.4. Complexity of reasoning with supported models
It turns out that, as in the case of disjunctive logic programs, reasoning with supported models is easier (assuming the
polynomial hierarchy does not collapse) than reasoning with stable or FLP-stable models. Namely, we have the following
result.
Theorem 14. The problem of the existence of a supported model is NP-complete. Skeptical reasoning with supported models is coNP-
complete. Brave reasoning with supported models is NP-complete.
Proof. Given a theory F and a set of atoms Y , Y is a minimal model of F Y if and only if Y | F Y and for every a ∈ Y ,
Y \ {a} | F Y (by the monotonicity of F Y , cf. Proposition 10). Since F Y can be computed in polynomial time, it follows
that the problem of the existence of a supported model of a theory F is in the class NP. The membership of the other
two problems in their respective classes can also be established as a consequence of the observation that the problem of
checking whether a set of atoms Y is a supported model of a theory F is in the class P. The hardness part follows in each
case from the well-known hardness of the corresponding problems under the restriction to normal programs. For the sake
of completeness, we will outline here a proof that the problem of the existence of a supported model of a normal program
is NP-hard. To this end, we note that by the Fages Lemma [18], for normal programs without positive atoms in the bodies
of rules, stable and supported models coincide. The problem of the existence of a stable model for such programs is NP-
complete (the construction used by Marek and Truszczyn´ski [39], demonstrates that). Thus, the problem of the existence of
a supported model for such programs is NP-complete, too and, consequently, the NP-hardness of the problem for arbitrary
normal programs follows. 
5.5. Normal form result for the supported-model semantics
As in the other two cases, also for the supported-model semantics every theory has a normal form. However, now it is
given by even simpler formulas — conjunctions of normal rules. We start by stating several simple properties concerning
the equivalence of formulas with respect to SPP-models. We say that two formulas F and G are SPP-equivalent, denoted
F ≡spp G , if they have the same SPP-models.
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(1) F → G ≡spp ¬F ∨ G;
(2) ¬(F ∨ G) ≡spp ¬F ∧ ¬G;
(3) ¬(F ∧ G) ≡spp ¬F ∨ ¬G;
(4) F ∧ (G ∨ H) ≡spp (F ∧ G) ∨ (F ∧ H);
(5) F ∨ (G ∧ H) ≡spp (F ∨ G) ∧ (F ∨ H);
(6) ¬¬¬F ≡spp ¬F ;
(7) ¬ ≡spp ⊥ and ¬⊥ ≡spp ;
(8) F ∧ ⊥ ≡spp ⊥ and F ∨ ⊥ ≡spp F ;
(9) F ∧  ≡spp F and F ∨  ≡spp ;
(10) F ◦ F ≡spp F , for ◦ = ∧ and ∨.
Proof. (1) If 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F → G then Y | F or 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G . We recall that 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬F if and only if Y | F (The-
orem 11(2)). Thus, 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬F or 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G and so, 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬F ∨ G . Conversely, if 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬F ∨ G then
Y | ¬F ∨ G (Theorem 11(1)) and, consequently, Y | F → G . Moreover, 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬F or 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G . Thus, Y | F or
〈X, Y 〉 |spp G (again by Theorem 11(2)), and the claim follows.
The properties (2) and (3) follow by Theorem 11(2) and the corresponding properties of equivalence in propositional
logic. For instance, 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬(F ∨ G) if and only if Y | F ∨ G (Theorem 11(2)). The latter condition is equivalent to
Y | F and Y | G . This conjunction, in turn, is equivalent to 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬F and 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬G (Theorem 11(2), again).
Thus, 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬(F ∨ G) if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |spp ¬F ∧ ¬G , which implies (2).
The properties (4) and (5) follow from the inductive deﬁnition of |spp for the connectives ∧ and ∨. For instance,
〈X, Y 〉 |spp F ∧ (G ∨ H) if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F and 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G ∨ H . The latter condition can be equivalently re-
stated as 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F , and 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G or 〈X, Y 〉 |spp H , or as 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F and 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G , or 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F and
〈X, Y 〉 |spp H . Using the inductive deﬁnition of |spp for the connectives ∧ and ∨, we get that 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F ∧ (G ∨ H) if
and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |spp (F ∧ G) ∨ (F ∧ H), thus proving (4).
The property (6) follows from Theorem 11(2), and the property (7) from the deﬁnitions of the shorthands  and ¬, and
from the deﬁnition of |spp . The remaining three properties follow from the inductive deﬁnition of |spp for the connectives
∧ and ∨ and the facts that ⊥ has no SPP-models and  is satisﬁed by every SPP-model. 
The normal form result is now a consequence of Proposition 11 and Theorem 13.
Theorem 15. Let F be a theory. Then there is a program G consisting of normal rules such that F and G have the same essential
SPP-models (and so, are strongly SPP-equivalent and have the same supported models).
Proof. It is enough to prove that for every formula F there is a program consisting of normal rules that has the same essen-
tial SPP-models as F . Let us consider the following transformation of F . First, we replace in F every subformula G → H with
¬G ∨ H (Proposition 11(1)). Then, we proceed as in the case of propositional logic when constructing a CNF representation
of the formula, using De Morgan Laws (Proposition 11(2) and (3)) to move negation in, then using the “triple negation” law
(Proposition 11(4)), distributivity properties (Proposition 11(5) and (6)), and simpliﬁcation rules (Proposition 11(7)–(10)).
When that process ends, we split the resulting conjunction into the set of its conjuncts — disjunctions that are of the
form
C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ck ∨ ¬A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Am ∨ ¬¬B1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬¬Bn, (3)
where Ai , Bi , and Ci are atoms. By Proposition 11, the set of these formulas has the same SPP-models as the original
formula F . Thus, it is strongly SPP-equivalent to F .
Next, we note that if k 2, then formulas
C1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ck ∨ G
and
k∧
i=1
(Ci ∨ ¬¬C1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬¬Ci−1 ∨ ¬¬Ci+1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬¬Ck ∨ G),
where Ci are atoms and G is a formula, have the same essential models and, consequently, they are strongly SPP-equivalent.
Thus, each disjunction (3) can be rewritten into a strongly SPP-equivalent set of disjunctions:
Ci ∨ ¬¬C1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬¬Ci−1 ∨ ¬¬Ci+1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬¬Ck ∨ ¬A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Am ∨ ¬¬B1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬¬Bn,
where 1 i  k.
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A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am ∧ ¬B1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Bn ∧ ¬C1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Ci−1 ∧ ¬Ci+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Ck → Ci,
1 i  k. Thus, the assertion follows. 
5.6. Relationships
Finally, we will study the relationship between the semantics given by relations |ht and |ﬂp , on the one hand, and
|spp , on the other. To this end, we observe ﬁrst that SPP-models are HT-models and FLP-models.
Proposition 12. For every formula F and every X ⊆ Y ⊆ At:
(1) 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F implies 〈X, Y 〉 |ht F ;
(2) 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F implies 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F .
Proof. We proceed by induction. Both for (1) and (2), the base case and the inductive step for F = G ◦ H , where ◦ = ∨
and ∧, follow from the observation that the corresponding conditions deﬁning the relations |spp , |ht and |ﬂp are the
same.
Let us consider F = G → H . Let us assume that 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F . It follows that
Y | G → H; and Y | G or 〈X, Y 〉 |spp H . (4)
We know that Y | G implies 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G [21]. Combining that with the induction hypothesis, we obtain from (4) that
Y | G → H ; and 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G or 〈X, Y 〉 |ht H . Thus, 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G → H follows.
It also follows from (4) that Y | G → H ; and Y | G or 〈X, Y 〉 |spp H or X | G (we have added one more disjunct to the
second conjunct). By the induction hypothesis, that new disjunction implies Y | G or 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp H or X | G . Consequently,
〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp G → H follows. 
As a corollary, we now obtain that, as in the case of disjunctive logic programming, stable models (both under the
standard and FLP generalizations) are supported models.
Theorem 16. For every theory F and every set of atoms Y , if Y is a stable model of F or Y is an FLP-stable model of F , then Y is a
supported model of F .
Proof. The proof is the same in both cases. Thus, we show the argument in the ﬁrst case only. Let Y be a stable model
of F . It follows that 〈Y , Y 〉 |ht F . Consequently, Y | F (cf. Theorem 1) and so, 〈Y , Y 〉 |spp F (by Theorem 11). Let us
assume that X ⊆ Y and 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F . Then 〈X, Y 〉 |ht F (Proposition 12). Since Y is a stable model of F , X = Y . Thus, Y
is a supported model of F . 
In general, the implications in Proposition 12 cannot be reversed. However, in the case of the relation |ht , we can ﬁnd
a broad class of formulas for which the converse implication holds, too. The key is the following result that exhibits a class
of formulas, for which the relation |ht reduces to the standard propositional entailment. Before we state it, we recall that
an occurrence of an atom A in a formula is directly under the scope of ¬, if it is the antecedent in the subformula A → ⊥.
Proposition 13. Let F be a formula such that every occurrence of an atom in F is directly under the scope of ¬. Then, for every
X ⊆ Y ⊆ At, 〈X, Y 〉 |ht F if and only if Y | F .
Proof. The claim is evident if F = ⊥. Otherwise, F is of the form F = G ◦ H , where ◦ = ∨,∧ or →. First, let us assume that
◦ =→, G is an atom and H = ⊥. Then, the claim follows from Theorem 1(2). Otherwise, the induction hypothesis applies to
G and H (every occurrence of an atom in G and H is directly under the scope of ¬) and again, the inductive step is easy
to verify. 
This result has several consequences. First, we show that we can express the relation |spp in terms of the relation |ht .
Moreover, it does not require any extension of the language. Given a formula F , we deﬁne F to be the formula obtained by
replacing every nonhead occurrence of an atom A that is not directly negated with ¬¬A.
Proposition 14. For every formula F and every X ⊆ Y ⊆ At, 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |ht F .
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Since G ◦ H = G ◦H , for ◦ = ∧ and ∨, for these two connectives, the induction step is easy to verify. Thus, let F = G → H .
Clearly, F = G ′ → H , where G ′ is obtained from G by replacing every occurrence of an atom A that is not directly negated
with ¬¬A. Proposition 13 applies to G ′ . Thus, 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G ′ if and only if Y | G ′ . By the deﬁnitions of G ′ and of the
classical entailment relation |, Y | G ′ if and only if Y | G . Thus, 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G ′ if and only if Y | G . Finally, by the
induction hypothesis, 〈X, Y 〉 |ht H if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |spp H . Consequently, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) 〈X, Y 〉 |spp G → H ;
(2) Y | G → H ; and Y | G or 〈X, Y 〉 |spp H ;
(3) Y | G ′ → H ; and 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G ′ or 〈X, Y 〉 |ht H ;
(4) 〈X, Y 〉 |ht G ′ → H ;
(5) 〈X, Y 〉 |ht F .
Thus, the claim for F = G → H follows. 
Corollary 8. For every formula F and every interpretation Y , Y is a supported model of F if and only if it is a stable model of F .
Next, we observe that it is impossible to express |ht in terms of |spp . The following corollary makes the meaning of
that statement precise.
Corollary 9. Let A and B be atoms. There is no formula F such that 〈X, Y 〉 |ht A → B ∨ ¬B ∨ ¬A if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F .
Proof. Let H = A → B∨¬B∨¬A. It is easy to verify that 〈∅, {A, B}〉 |ht H and 〈{A}, {A, B}〉 |ht H . Let us assume that there
is a formula F such that for every X ⊆ Y , 〈X, Y 〉 |ht H if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F . Then, 〈∅, {A, B}〉 |ht F . By Theorem 12,
∅ | F {A,B} . By Proposition 10, F Y is monotone. Thus, {A} | F {A,B} or, equivalently, 〈{A}, {A, B}〉 |ht F , a contradiction. 
Given our result on the biexpressibility of stable and FLP-stable semantics, it follows that for every theory F there is a
theory F ′ such that Y is a supported model of F if and only if Y is an FLP-stable model of F ′ . In other words, we can
express supported models in terms of FLP-stable models without the need to expand the language. On the other hand, there
is a theory F such that for no theory F ′ , FLP-stable models of F are exactly supported models for F ′ . Thus, FLP-stable
models cannot be (in general) expressed as supported models, unless we extend the language.
As a corollary to Proposition 14 we obtain the promised result showing a class of formulas, which have the same HT-
and SPP-models.
Proposition 15. Let F be a formula such that every occurrence of an atom in F is either a head occurrence or falls directly under the
scope of ¬. For every X ⊆ Y ⊆ At, 〈X, Y 〉 |ht F if and only if 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F .
Proof. Since under the assumptions about F , we have F = F , the claim follows from Proposition 14. 
In turn, this result implies the following generalization of the property that stable and supported models of purely
negative disjunctive programs coincide.
Corollary 10. Let F be a theory such that every occurrence of an atom in F is either a head occurrence or falls directly under the scope
of ¬. Then Y is a stable model of F if and only if it is a supported model of F .
There is an alternative argument that shows that the |spp relation can be expressed by means of the |ht and |ﬂp
relations.3 It is based on the following simple observation that identiﬁes a class of formulas on which all three semantics
coincide.
Proposition 16. Let F be a formula in which every occurrence of → has ⊥ in the consequent (in other words, formulas that can be
written by means of the connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬). For every HT-interpretation 〈X, Y 〉, the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) 〈X, Y 〉 |ht F ;
(2) 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F ;
(3) 〈X, Y 〉 |spp F .
3 This argument is due to one of the anonymous reviewers.
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F = G ∨ H are the same. Moreover, for each of the three satisﬁability relations, 〈X, Y 〉 satisﬁes (in the corresponding sense)
¬G if and only if Y | G (and so, for such formulas, the three satisﬁability relations also coincide). Thus, the result follows
by induction. 
For every formula F , we denote by F the formula obtained from F by replacing each subformula G → H , where H = ⊥,
with (G → ⊥) ∨ H (or ¬G ∨ H , for short).
Corollary 11. For every formula F , SPP-models of F coincide with HT-models of F , with FLP-models of F and with SPP-models of F .
Proof. By Proposition 11(1), F and F have the same SPP-models. Thus, the assertion follows from Proposition 16. 
The value of our ﬁrst approach to show that the SPP semantics can be expressed in terms of HT and FLP semantics,
which uses F → F transformation, is in that it gives Corollary 10, a generalization of the property that in purely negative
disjunctive programs stable and supported models coincide. On the other hand, the value of the approach based on the
F → F transformation lies in the fact that it shows a class of formulas (theories), on which all three semantics coincide.
6. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we developed generalizations of the FLP semantics and the supported-model semantics to the full language
of propositional logics using appropriate variants of methods developed earlier by Pearce and Ferraris for the stable-model
semantics. In this way, all three semantics are cast in the same uniform framework, which facilitates comparisons and offers
insights into their properties. Our results contribute to the theoretical foundations of answer-set programming, a major
knowledge representation formalism.
More speciﬁcally, Ferraris [19] showed that the stable-model semantics can be extended to the language of propositional
logic by means of an appropriate generalization of the notion of the F-reduct. We showed that the approach by Ferraris
can be adapted to two other semantics of programs: the FLP and supported-model semantics. Moreover, the generalizations
require only small changes in the deﬁnition of the reduct that concern how the implication is handled in the case both
its antecedent and consequent are satisﬁed by the context. In the case of the FLP-reduct, we keep the antecedent of the
implication unchanged, in the case of the SPP-reduct, we drop it.
Not only the deﬁnitions follow the same pattern. The theories of the three semantics are quite similar, too, both in
the way the results are stated as well as proved. In particular, in each case, we have a corresponding characterization of
the semantics in terms of a satisﬁability relation between HT-interpretations and formulas similar to the characterization
of the stable-model semantics of arbitrary propositional theory by Pearce [44]. As before, what differentiates between the
relations is the way the implication is handled.
The uniformity with which the three semantics can be deﬁned and studied is striking. It suggests that considering the
reduct-based approach in the general language of logic, may reveal new insights into the phenomenon of nonmonotonicity.
A related question is whether any other semantics can be deﬁned in this way, that is, whether there are any other notions
of reduct that might lead to useful formalisms. As there seem to be no simple ways to modify the reduct left, the uniform
approach presented here suggests that the realm of nonmonotonic semantics of programs and theories may essentially boil
down to the three ones discussed in the paper.
The uniformity notwithstanding, there are also differences. We saw that the relation |spp is, in some sense, weaker than
the other two. Further, the relation |ht that captures the stable-models semantics deﬁnes a logic, namely the logic HT.
To the contrary, the relation |ﬂp does not: the set of formulas F such that for every 〈X, Y 〉, 〈X, Y 〉 |ﬂp F while closed
under modus ponens, is not closed under substitution.4 Also, while stable and FLP semantics are closely related, supported-
model semantics is essentially different (cf. the characterization of strong SPP-equivalence, and the normal form theorem).
A detailed comparison of the semantics is beyond the scope of this paper. We leave it for future work.
We note here that our argument for the normal form result with respect to SPP-models can be adjusted to show that
the set of theorems with respect to |spp is closed under substitution and so, is a logic. The question of axiomatization of
that logic is for now open.
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